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Abstract
Detecting signs that someone is a member of a hostile outgroup can depend on very subtle cues. How do ecology-relevant
motivational states affect such detections? This research investigated the detection of briefly-presented enemy (versus
friend) insignias after participants were primed to be self-protective or revenge-minded. Despite being told to ignore the
objectively nondiagnostic cues of ethnicity (Arab vs. Western/European), gender, and facial expressions of the targets, both
priming manipulations enhanced biases to see Arab males as enemies. They also reduced the ability to detect ingroup
enemies, even when these faces displayed angry expressions. These motivations had very different effects on accuracy,
however, with self-protection enhancing overall accuracy and revenge-mindedness reducing it. These methods
demonstrate the importance of considering how signal detection tasks that occur in motivationally-charged environments
depart from results obtained in conventionally motivationally-inert laboratory settings.
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Introduction
Consider the great challenge confronting soldiers facing a
hostile insurgency in a foreign country: They must detect subtle
and imperfectly diagnostic signals that may reveal whether an
approaching individual is an enemy or a friend, and must do so
knowing that making an inaccurate decision—in either direc-
tion—could bear a mortal cost to self or others. Motivational
factors may further complicate the situation. How might the
decisions made by soldiers focused on self-protection differ from
those made by soldiers who desire revenge on those responsible for
killing a platoon-mate in battle?
Signal detection problems such as this one—with strong
functional relevance for the perceiver—differ from those typically
employed in signal detection research, which tend to be run in
laboratories that are motivationally sanitized and unemotional by
design. Although understandable in some respects, this convention
is problematic in others. Important decisions often occur in social
contexts that engage fundamental motivational systems that, in
turn, exert substantial influence over cognition; this motivational
modulation of cognition may be especially substantial where the
cognitive task is as functionally central as threat detection [1]. In the
present research we investigate motivational states related to self-
protection and revenge-mindedness, and how these influence the
detection of signals that identify individuals as enemies or allies.
One promising approach to understanding such influences
involves the coupling of error management theory—which proposes that
people are cognitively biased to minimize the costs of signal
detection errors [2,3]—with a sociofunctional perspective on
motivation and cognition—which highlights the role basic biologi-
cal and social problems had in shaping the links between decision-
making and motivation [4,5]. This combined approach suggests
that decision-making will depend on the goals of the perceiver as
well as the perceived social and informational context. For example,
people are inclined to over-perceive signs of interpersonal threat
when they are feeling fearful, but these perceptions tend to be
focused on social targets heuristically associated with the greatest
potential to do harm: outgroup males [6,7,8]. Applying this same
logic to the current research, we expect predictable biases in threat
detection that will be differentially modulated by the activation of
self-protection or revenge-mindedness.
Error Management and Enemy Detection Biases
Viewing novel faces entails automatic encoding of commu-
nicative signals and social categories [9,10]. Because these signals
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e23929and categories may be differentially associated with the inclination
and potential to do harm, error management strategies that
minimize one’s exposure to threats are likely be relatively
automatic as well. Three such signals of threat seem especially
likely to signal danger. First, angry facial expressions signal an
enhanced likelihood of aggression and can be difficult to ignore
[11]. The safer error to make is to incorrectly presume that an
angry person intends harm than to incorrectly assume the person
is friendly; it is less costly to mistakenly avoid a benign individual
than to mistakenly approach a dangerous one. Second, because
ingroup members facilitate a wide range of functionally critical
goals for one another (e.g., [12]) and intergroup interactions have
historically been associated with relatively higher levels of danger
[13,14], biases should, and do, exist to generally see ingroup
members more positively (e.g., [15]) and outgroup members
negatively, especially when threat-related goals are temporarily
active [16,17]. Third, male faces should also be particularly likely
to incur such a bias because human males, relative to females, are
more likely to hurt others [18,7].
A number of studies support the often combinatorial role these
three factors play in threat detection processes. An emerging
literature on intergroup processing suggests that cues to threat
enhance processing of outgroup members (from groups stereo-
typically associated with harm). These cues include angry
expressions and masculinity as well as threatening concepts and
objects [16,19,20]. For example, Correll and colleagues have
shown that, when placed in situations that require discriminating
between targets that possess or do not possess weapons, people are
more likely to ‘‘shoot’’ unarmed Black males than unarmed White
males [21]. Even professional police officers exhibit such biases
[22]. Outgroup members can themselves also enhance processing
of threat-related stimuli. For instance, viewing Black male faces
leads perceivers to more rapidly identify images of guns, even
when these images are strongly degraded [19,23]. Such findings fit
within an error management framework. However, existing
research has tended to presume underlying motivation, or measure
it at the level of individual differences [24], but not directly
manipulate threat-relevant goals. We might expect that because
primed goals can influence automatic evaluations [25], in the
context of self-protection or revenge goals, such biases may be
further amplified.
Accuracy
Whereas error management theory generates clear predictions
about biases, it is mute regarding accuracy. Recent research
reveals, however, that the activation of important goals can
enhance the accuracy of cognitive processing. For instance,
thinking about survival enhances performance on a memory task
[26], and perceivers focused specifically on self-protection more
efficiently encode outgroup male faces—they gain additional
memory ‘‘bang’’ for their attentional ‘‘buck’’ [6]. We might thus
also anticipate perceivers concerned with self-protection to exhibit
enhanced accuracy in the detection and use of cues identifying
individuals as enemies and friends.
In contrast, a functional perspective does not predict that
revenge should increase accuracy. The purpose of revenge is
retaliatory and retributive, and this can often be accomplished
with broadly biased responses against whole groups rather than
focused responses to the specific individual who elicited the desire
for revenge. Furthermore, the anger experienced when we desire
revenge may actually work in opposition to self-protective
motivations, as anger has been shown to suppress fear in mildly
dangerous situations [27]. Revenge thus serves as a nice counter-
point to self-protection, because while both may introduce biases
that promote ingroup/outgroup discriminations, they should
produce quite different effects when it comes to accuracy.
Standard methods of signal detection analysis can be used to
estimate both bias and sensitivity, or signal discriminability.
Importantly, these effects can be independent of one another
(i.e., we can become more sensitive to a discrimination but
continue to show a response bias as well). In line with the above
reasoning, we hypothesized (1) that activating a goal of self-
protection should place the cognitive system on alert, increasing
sensitivity relative to revenge motivations (the self-protective vigilance
hypothesis) and (2) that there would also be enhanced anti-male,
anti-angry, and anti-outgroup biases in both motivation conditions
(the intergroup bias hypothesis).
Overview of the Present Experiment
We asked participants to make decisions concerning the
‘‘friend’’ or ‘‘enemy’’ status of briefly presented target individuals
who were identified with perfectly diagnostic enemy/friend
insignia but who differed in terms of perfectly nondiagnostic
ingroup/outgroup status, facial expression, and sex. Prior to the
decision task, participants visualized scenarios designed to
activate one of two motivational systems especially relevant to
the lives of soldiers in combat—self-protection and revenge-
mindedness.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This research was approved by the IRB at Arizona State
University, and all participants read and signed statements of
informed consent.
Participants
249 (86 women) students who identified themselves as not being
of Arabic or Middle Eastern background participated in exchange
for course credit.
Materials
Stimuli consisted of black and white photographs of faces, sized
at 261 1/3 in., that varied across the following dimensions:
Ethnicity (Arab or Western European, indicated by the presence
or absence of Arabic headdress), Sex (Male or Female), and
Expression (slightly Angry or Neutral). Eight faces of each of the
eight types were constructed, though any individual participant
was randomly assigned to see only half of these faces. Expressions
were created by digitally manipulating neutrally expressive faces to
lower the inner brow, tighten the mouth, and flare the nostrils. A
separate group of 24 participants identified these faces as angry
with 100% accuracy, and no one reported suspicion that the
expressions were not naturally posed.
The task-relevant stimuli were the letters ‘‘E’’ and ‘‘F’’,
constructed from pieces of the face stimuli so the facial photos
could serve as post-stimulus masks. The resulting stimuli were
approximately 1/3 in. square. We should emphasize here that the
signal that was being detected was separate and distinct from the
images of the faces. It was an ‘‘E’’ or an ‘‘F’’ that was temporally
sandwiched between two displays of the face image, so qualities of
the face images, like the headgear on Arabic targets or the greater
variability of the hairstyles for the Western targets, should have
little effect on the signal’s discriminability.
Procedure
Participants were informed that they were participating in a
simulation of circumstances faced by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and
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‘‘friends’’ based on briefly presented insignias. Participants were
told that equal numbers of enemies (and friends) were male and
female, angry versus neutrally expressive, and Arab versus
Western. These characteristics were explicitly descried as non-
diagnostic of enemy status, and great efforts were taken to ensure
that participants understood this.
Motivational states were activated by having participants listen
to one of three narrated, guided visualization passages: (1) self-
protection (participants imagined being ambushed while in a
hostile foreign city), (2) revenge-mindedness (participants imagined
a friend had been ambushed by a foreign combatant, after which
the combatant becomes vulnerable to retribution), or (3) a control
scenario (participants imagined visiting a foreign marketplace,
which featured the same foreign peoples but involved no threat).
Participants were asked to try to experience the emotions
described in the scenario, because these emotions ‘‘should facilitate
performance on the subsequent tasks.’’
Following this manipulation, participants engaged in three
blocks (32 trials each) of a decision task. In each trial, participants
were asked to focus on a fixation point (‘+’) appearing in the center
of the screen for 1000 ms. A face then appeared (for 500 ms in
block one, 200 ms in blocks two and three), followed by the letter
‘E’ or ‘F’ (for 50 ms in block one, 30 ms in block two, and 10 ms
in block three), which appeared in four different places within the
contours of the faces to prevent participants from focusing on a
single location. Finally, the original face reappeared again as a
mask, giving participants 1.5 seconds to identify the face as enemy
or friend based on the letter that had appeared by pressing the ‘A’
key or the ‘5’ key on the numeric keypad, labeled with an ‘E’ or ‘F’
accordingly. Each face’s status as an enemy or friend was
counterbalanced, but remained constant across the three blocks
for any given participant.
Results
We analyzed enemy detection as a function of the type of face,
using standard signal detection methods [28], which afford
separate indices of signal discriminability (d9)—how effectively
observers distinguished between insignias—and observer bias
(c)—the overall inclination to label faces as ‘‘enemy’’ or ‘‘friend.’’
These measures were calculated using faces, not participants, as
the unit of analysis, to ensure that the normality assumptions of
signal detection theory were met [28], and complete means and
standard deviations are included in Table 1.
Participant Sex and Block did not moderate effects relevant to
our primary hypotheses, so they are collapsed in subsequent
analyses. We conducted two 4-way mixed ANOVAs, with
motivational condition (control, self-protection, and revenge) as a
within-item manipulation and target sex, target ethnicity, and
target expression as between-item factors.
Bias
At the most general level, there was an overall bias to identify
faces as ‘‘friends’’ (grand mean=20.07, F1,56=9.56, p=.003,
g
2
p=.145). Moreover, although participants were explicitly told
that ethnicity, facial expression, and sex were not diagnostic of
enemy status, all three cues elicited significant biases. Relative to
their counterparts, angry faces were more likely to be called
‘‘enemy’’, F1,56=74.8, p,.001, g
2
p=.578, and female faces were
more likely to be called ‘‘friend’’, F1,56=5.56, p=.022, g
2
p=.090,
as were Western faces, F1,56=34.3, p,.001, g
2
p=.380.
Table 1. Full means for the Bias and d-prime measures as a function of target race, target gender, target expression, and
participant condition (standard deviations in parentheses).
Bias
Race Gender Expression Control Self-Protection Revenge
Arab Female Angry 0.17 (0.14) 0.3 (0.36) 0.07 (0.26)
Neutral 20.12 (0.12) 20.27 (0.37) 20.18 (0.38)
Male Angry 0.22 (0.28) 0.31 (0.16) 0.28 (0.26)
Neutral 20.07 (0.41) 0.07 (0.29) 20.02 (0.25)
European Female Angry 0.1 (0.31) 20.07 (0.25) 20.12 (0.29)
Neutral 20.56 (0.25) 20.26 (0.2) 20.53 (0.18)
Male Angry 0.27 (0.36) 20.03 (0.21) 0.01 (0.2)
Neutral 20.39 (0.16) 20.38 (0.16) 20.46 (0.33)
Detection Sensitivity (d9)
Race Gender Expression Control Self-Protection Revenge
Arab Female Angry 0.99 (0.44) 1.13 (0.29) 0.92 (0.63)
Neutral 0.97 (0.38) 1.25 (0.22) 0.95 (0.59)
Male Angry 1.06 (0.43) 1.19 (0.3) 1.06 (0.45)
Neutral 1.25 (0.57) 1.24 (0.57) 0.96 (0.4)
European Female Angry 1.19 (0.28) 1.12 (0.28) 1.2 (0.63)
Neutral 1.48 (0.34) 1.41 (0.28) 1.2 (0.43)
Male Angry 1.29 (0.29) 1.47 (0.43) 1.03 (0.53)
Neutral 1.11 (0.37) 1.28 (0.48) 1.26 (0.61)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023929.t001
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condition, target race, and target expression, F2,112=4.29,
p=.016, g
2
p=.071, supporting the intergroup bias hypothesis (see
Figure 1b). Whereas control participants were biased to identify
angry faces as enemies regardless of whether they were Arabic or
Western European (main effect within control: F1,31=7.95,
p=.01; no interaction with race), the bias against angry
Westerners vanished in both the self-protection and revenge-
mindedness conditions (both Fs,1).
Signal discriminability
Analyses of d9 within each motivation condition revealed two main
effects. First, participants were significantly better at discriminating
the insignias of Western faces as opposed to Arabic faces (F1,56=4.72,
p=.034, g
2
p=.078). More importantly, supporting the self-protection
vigilance hypothesis, a main effect of motivation (F2,112=3.95, p=.022,
g
2
p=.066) revealed that self-protection concern enhanced accuracy
whereas revenge-mindedness decreased it, relative to control (see
Figure 1c). In contrast to revenge-mindedness, self-protection
motivation enhanced participants’ accuracy in detecting enemies
while minimizing the false alarms in which they mistakenly labeled
friends as enemies, F1,56=4.72, p=.034, g
2
p=.078.
Discussion
The present experiment revealed motivational modulations of
enemy signal detection consistent with an error management
approach to heuristic cues to threat. First, in support of our
intergroup bias hypothesis, there were pronounced biases to label angry
faces, outgroup members, and males as ‘‘enemies.’’ Given that it is
reasonable to assume that perpetrators of intergroup violence were
historically likely to be male and rarely wear the trappings of the
ingroup, it makes functional sense that these cues are used to avoid
costly errors. Intriguingly, both self-protection and revenge-
mindedness essentially eliminated the biases against angry faces
of the ingroup, which suggests that coalitional bonds outweigh
overt signs of threat (indeed, within the context of observing both
ingroup and outgroup males, the angry expressions on Westerners
may be interpreted as expressing threat against the outgroup, instead
Figure 1. Figure 1a shows bias as a function of target gender and ethnicity, collapsed across facial expression. While there is a bias to
see Arabic men as ‘‘enemies’’—and this bias becomes more pronounced in both the self-protection and revenge conditions—there is an even
greater bias to call ingroup members ‘‘friends’’, which entails missing more ingroup enemies. Figure 1b depicts bias for faces showing slight anger
(collapsed across target gender), and clearly shows that self-protection and revenge wipe out the bias to call angry ingroup members ‘‘enemies’’: In
the control condition there is a strong bias to call any angry face an enemy, but both self-protection and revenge conditions completely eliminate
this bias for ingroup faces. Figure 1c shows participant accuracy in discriminating between enemies and friends.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023929.g001
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bias for neutrally expressive faces of the ingroup is approximately
twice the size of the ‘‘enemy’’ bias for angry faces of the outgroup,
which suggests that coalitional biases are aligned more to favor
‘‘us’’ than to disfavor ‘‘them’’.
In support of the self-protective vigilance hypothesis, a self-protection
motivation enhanced people’s ability to discriminate between the
insignias of enemies and friends, while revenge-mindedness
motivation gave rise to no such enhancement and trended toward
a decrease in discrimination performance. In other words, self-
protection simultaneously manages two kinds of errors: it
minimizes the missing of threats but it also minimizes false alarms
calling potential allies ‘‘enemies’’.
Conclusion
We found that people were generally inclined to perceive angry,
outgroup, and male faces as enemies. A self-protection motivation
biased perceivers to view angry outgroup individuals as enemies
and ingroup members as friends, but actually increased identifica-
tion accuracy. Revenge motivation increased the tendency to label
outgroup individuals as enemies as well, but it generally decreased
the overall accuracy of judgments. We can therefore conclude that
self-protection appears to sharpen the senses at the same time that
it biases decisions, while revenge-mindedness inclines the perceiver
to be biased against outgroup members and in favor of ingroup
members, but it does so at the cost of accuracy. We can find little
precedent for this effect in the scientific literature, but the idea that
revenge dulls decision making is quite consistent with anecdotal
accounts of retributive violence in combat situations as well as in
counter-insurgency operations.
These findings underscore the utility of investigating how threat-
detection can be altered by motivating circumstances. Merely
having participants imagine themselves in dangerous situations led
to functionally adaptive alterations in signal detection that could
have profound consequences under more engaging circumstances
in the field. Although these effects may generally reflect
traditionally functionally adaptive responses, they may also be
quite problematic from the perspective of policy-makers and
employers. However, the methods employed here could identify
individuals capable of highly accurate decisions under pressure as
well as those most prone to dangerous biases, thereby positively
informing selection and training for signal detection tasks that
occur in emotionally-charged environments. More broadly, the
present results suggest that fundamental motivational systems
adaptively modulate the detection of social signals, and research
programs exploring social perception in this way may lay the
groundwork for a more developed model of human information
processing in real world circumstances.
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